> For the complete documentation index, see [llms.txt](https://solieum.gitbook.io/solieum/llms.txt). Markdown versions of documentation pages are available by appending `.md` to page URLs; this page is available as [Markdown](https://solieum.gitbook.io/solieum/parameters.md). # Protocol Parameters A parameter with no stated unit and no stated owner is a number in marketing copy. This page gives each one its value, where it is fixed, and how it could change. Devnet values are labelled devnet. ## Settlement and disputes | Parameter | Value | Fixed where | How it changes | | ---------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | Challenge window | **432,000 slots**, 48 hours at the 400 ms target | A single constant in the settlement core, read at chain initialization | Only by initializing a new chain. There is **no setter**, so the constant governs chains created after it and nothing already running | | Air gap between proof and payout | **24 hours** by the mainnet design; **3,600 s** on the devnet portal | The portal's configuration at initialization | Portal configuration | | Total exit | Window plus air gap, **about three days** | Derived | Quote this, never the window alone | | Minimum response window per dispute move | **1,500 slots**, 600 s at the target | Dispute core constant, enforced as a floor | Redeploy | | Moves in a dispute | `2 × ceil(log2(steps)) + 1`; **35** for a 131,072-step trace | Derived | Not a setting | | Worst-case game duration | **5.8 hours** at the floor, **35 hours** at one-hour rounds | Derived | A dispute that cannot finish inside the window is refused at open | | Proposer bond | **100,000 lamports**, a devnet placeholder | Settlement configuration | Must be re-derived against value at risk before real deposits, with an automated review trigger as TVL grows | | Largest disputable trace | **131,072 steps**, the ceiling the proposer bond implies | Derived from the bond | Moves with the bond | | Compute allowance for a witnessed step | **700,000 CU** of a transaction's 1,400,000 | Dispute program | Redeploy | The window and every dispute deadline are denominated in **slots**, not seconds. A halted chain produces no slots, so a move deadline freezes, an honest party cannot be timed out, and the window cannot run out while nobody could have challenged. {% hint style="info" %} Devnet slots measure about **166 ms**, not 400, so a 432,000-slot window runs about **20 hours of wall clock** on devnet. Every duration quoted in hours in this paper is at the 400 ms target. {% endhint %} ## Sequencing | Parameter | Value | Notes | | ---------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | | Block cadence | **2 seconds**, and only when there is work | An idle chain produces no blocks and costs nothing | | Ordering rule | First-come, first-served by admission | Checkable against receipts and published batches | | Forced-inclusion ceiling | **24 hours** maximum delay | After it, derivation includes the transaction regardless of the operator | | Blockhash validity window | **150 blocks** of L2 history | The same replay guard wallets already understand | | Sequencer minimum bond | **0.1 SOL** on devnet | Mainnet value is a governance decision, sized to exceed what reordering inside one window could gain | | Reporter's share of a slashed bond | **50 percent**, remainder to the incinerator | Permissionless reporting, no allowlist | | Unbonding delay | **604,800 seconds** | Intended to exceed the challenge window, so a receipt from the last batch stays slashable while that batch is disputable | ## Fees and rent | Parameter | Value | Notes | | ----------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | | User fee | **5,000 lamports**, flat, in SOL | A placeholder for a composed fee, not a market price | | Fee destination | Burned before a per-chain activation height, credited to the genesis sequencer after it | The current chain crossed at **block 100** on 10 September 2026; each block reports which rule it used | | Composed fee margin and floor | **Zero**, both | The absence of a published price rather than a price. Computed today, charged by nothing | | Priority fees | **Not honoured** | An auction is planned | | Settlement cost per block | **3,291,520 lamports** sunk, plus a 100,000 bond returned | Rent is roughly 164x a block's fee revenue | | Break-even fill | **About 820 transactions** per block at the flat fee | Below it the chain is subsidised | | Measured data-availability floor | **About 280 lamports** per transaction on modelled sustained traffic | Sparse traffic compresses worse and costs more | | Root retention before rent reclaim | **1,000 newer final roots and 6,480,000 slots**, about thirty days | Built, not deployed. It is a proving deadline, so both bounds apply | | Batch retention before rent reclaim | **3,240,000 slots**, about fifteen days from seal | Built, not deployed. Longer than the window, shorter than root retention | ## State and proofs | Parameter | Value | Notes | | ----------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------ | | State commitment | **Sparse Merkle tree, depth 256**, keyed by the hash of the public key | Accounts and withdrawal leaves in one tree | | Proof size | A 256-bit bitmap plus non-empty siblings: **321 bytes, 8 siblings** over a 256-account chain | Non-inclusion is provable, which insertion witnesses require | | Hash calls | **257** per proof; **1,020** for a two-account witnessed step | | | One-step verification, system transfer | **19,216 CU** | Measured against the compiled program | | One-step verification, SPL token transfer | **20,408 CU** | Measured | | Interpreter memory commitment | Page tree of **32-byte pages at depth 59**, covering the full 64-bit address space | A proof is 59 hashes, about 9,000 CU | | Interpreter instruction commitment | Merkle tree over the instruction stream: **16 hashes** for a 65,536-instruction program | Binds index, instruction count and padding | | Deposit record | **94 bytes** | Domain tag, sequence, depositor, recipient, amount | ## Chain identity | | Current chain | Earlier chain | | ----------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------- | | Chain id | 7789 | 7788 | | Challenge window | 432,000 slots, 48 hours | Seven days, as created | | State tree | Sparse, from block 0 | Sorted-leaf | | Dispute authority | The dispute program's enforcer address, so verdicts **enforce** | A plain key, so a verdict does **not** enforce | Renumbering a chain produces a different chain: the genesis hash covers the Layer 1 program ids, so the identity and the deployment are bound together. The earlier chain is kept running for continuity, and its limitations are exactly why the current one was created. ## The programs on Solana devnet | Program | Address | | ---------------------- | ---------------------------------------------- | | Settlement | `85LdjERKaYnDKGJ6fWobhxvzLgJkQ6mfTS7K5NJFmZhg` | | Data availability | `6p4uYDP42tUP5MYfjMniEH4VJQWkuckT5rjhA87FmayL` | | Forced-inclusion inbox | `FxiCUnQ7d5AQVMGe7p6bssVthLUQTM5T7J6tLqkCCJ4n` | | Dispute game | `G7zcwYuXpXgdbuogLptuYwnLkv2KJ8F4fGPFP1sYnkpM` | | Bridge portal | `6ozbkkhDyZHiiogmHmUBahvV5kC3ryWi52cHqpPvDfis` | | Sequencer bond | `6KQdRji1ZKg3tGLUczeUyX9ywxnivXKbSSAM3hbzzY4L` | ## Which of these a token vote could ever change Governable, because they are economic: fee margins and floors, the bridge fee, fast-exit fee caps, reward schedules, retention windows within a floor the code enforces, treasury spending, and admission to a staked sequencer set. {% hint style="warning" %} **Not governable, because they are the security of the chain:** the challenge window and its unit, the air gap and who may deny a root, the dispute authority, the one-step classes and their boundaries, the state commitment, and the supply rule. Those live in code and change by redeploy. A vote that could move them would make the token the security, which is what it must not be. {% endhint %}